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I. Introduction 
The legal landscape for same-sex couples seeking to marry 
has shifted dramatically over the last five years. On October 10, 
2008, the Connecticut Supreme Court became the third state 
high court to rule that its state constitution could not sustain a 
statutory framework that excludes same-sex couples from mar­
rying,1 following the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court on 
November 18, 2003,2 and the California Supreme Court on May 
* Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. Many 
thanks to Eileen Rodriguez, Sarah Morton, Amanda Hainsworth, Liz Monnin-
Browder, Caitlin Reed, Karen Loewy, and Michele Granda for assistance with 
the preparation of and editing and research for this article. For purposes of 
disclosure, the author was one of the attorneys of record in both the Goodridge 
and Kerrigan marriage equality cases discussed herein. 
Perhaps the greatest challenge of writing about the marriage equality 
movement is keeping up with the pace of legal developments. Since the time 
this article was submittied for publication, two major changes have occurred, 
again significantly reforming the legal landscape. On April 3, 2009, the Iowa 
Supreme Court held that excluding same-sex couples from marrying violated 
that state's constitutional equality guarantees. Varnum v. Brien, __ N.W.2d 
__, 2009 WL 874044 (Iowa 2009). As a result of that opinion, same-sex 
couples may marry in Iowa beginning on April 27, 2009. In addition, during the 
2009 legislative session in Vermont, state legislators passed a marriage equality 
law. S. 115, "An Act Relating to Civil Marriage," 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 
2009) (enacted). Although vetoed by the governor, the legislators overrode the 
veto by the required supermajority ensuring that, as of September 1, 2009, 
same-sex couples may marry in Vermont. Similar legislation is pending in nu­
merous states throughout the country including in Connecticut (to codify that 
state high court opinion) (S.B. 899, 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2009)), New 
Hampshire (H.B. 439, 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2009)), and Maine. (L.D. 
1020, 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Me. 2009)). 
1 Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008). 
2 Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
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15, 2008.3 Same-sex couples throughout the country have gotten 
married in Connecticut, Massachusetts, California, and in other 
countries throughout the world that provide full marriage equal­
ity, including in Canada. 
This positive momentum for marriage equality has not pro­
ceeded uninterrupted, however. In between the implementation 
of the Massachusetts decision and the California decision, five 
state high courts rejected constitutional challenges to their states' 
exclusionary marriage statutes.4 In addition, with the national 
election on November 4, 2008, in which California, Florida, and 
Arizona banned marriage for same-sex couples, more than forty 
states have now amended their constitutions or enacted legisla­
tion to prohibit same-sex couples from marrying.5 The passage 
of Proposition 8 in California, which amended California's con­
stitution to define marriage as only being between a man and a 
woman, overruled in practice that state's positive Supreme Court 
decision, and halted the issuance of marriage licenses to same-sex 
couples.
6 
The validity of Proposition 8 has been contested, so the sta­
tus of marriage equality in California remains uncertain as this 
article goes to publication.7 In addition, the Iowa Supreme 
Court has not yet issued its decision about whether to uphold a 
lower court's determination that the state's discriminatory mar­
riage statute is unconstitutional. 
8 
At this point in time, same-sex couples throughout the coun­
try have married while political efforts continue to reverse the 
progress toward full equality that began in Massachusetts, ex­
isted for a time in California, and has continued in Connecticut. 
3 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008). 
4 Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571 (Md. 2007); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 
196 (N.J. 2006); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006); Li. & 
Kennedy v. Oregon, 110 P.3d 91 (Or. 2005); Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 
963 (Wash. 2005). 
5 Jesse McKinley & Laurie Goodstein, Bans in 3 States on Gay Marriage, 
N.Y. 	TIMES, Nov. 6, 2008, at Al. 
6 CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 7.5 (amended by initiative measure Proposition 8, 
Nov. 4, 2008). 
7 The date for oral argument of the case challenging the constitutionality 
of Proposition 8 was Mar. 5, 2009. The California Supreme Court will rule on 
the 	case within 90 days of the date or oral argument. 
8 Vamrnum v. Brien, No. CV5965 (Iowa Dist. Ct., Polk County, 2007). 
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Given the success of efforts to adopt exclusionary state constitu­
tional amendments and thus cut off the number of states where 
marriage equality could be pursued,9 marriage equality oppo­
nents are largely focused on defending Proposition 8 and in fur­
ther isolating the two New England states that allow same-sex 
couples to marry as iconoclastic exceptions to otherwise exclu­
sively heterosexual marriage regimes. 
This article looks at developments in the marriage equality 
movement from the time that the Massachusetts case was finally 
decided by its high court, and assesses the viability of efforts to 
turn back the clock on equal marriage rights. Because much has 
been written about the Massachusetts case and its place in his-
tory,10 this analysis starts with the decision by Connecticut's Su­
preme Court, the consolidated cases that became the California 
decision and contemporary challenges to the constitutional 
amendment that has since undermined its strength, as well as the 
cases in which state high courts rejected challenges to discrimina­
tory marriage laws. 
Backtracking in time, the article then addresses the legal de­
velopments that took place between the time the Massachusetts 
and California decisions were issued, focusing in particular on 
the fact that, for a short time, same-sex couples could marry in 
Massachusetts regardless of residency despite the existence of a 
reverse evasion law." The reverse evasion law, well-established 
in Massachusetts, until recently prohibited the issuance of mar­
riage licenses in Massachusetts to non-residents who traveled to 
Massachusetts specifically for the purpose of evading their own 
states' marriage prohibitions. While Massachusetts has since re­
pealed that reverse evasion law, 12 there remain serious questions 
about the legal significance of marriages entered into by out-of­
state couples in the interim period and uncertainty whether, for 
many of those out-of-state couples, those licenses issued lawfully. 
9 Thirty states currently have exclusionary constitutional amendments. 
See Human Rights Campaign, Statewide Marriage Prohibitions, www.hrc.org/ 
documents/marriage-prohibitions.pdf (Nov. 17, 2008). 
10 Mary L. Bonauto, Goodridge in Context, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 
(2005). 
11 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 207 §§ 11, 12, 13, 50 (1913). 
12 An Act Relative to Certain Marriage Laws, ch. 216, 2008 Mass. Acts 
(repealing sections 11, 12, 13, & 50 of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 207). 
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This article evaluates the validity of those marriages. The article 
concludes by predicting that efforts to reverse the course of his­
tory and shut down the ability of same-sex couples from across 
the country to marry will fail. 
II. Connecticut's Road to Equality 
A few months after the Goodridge v. Departmentof Public 
Health decision made it possible for same-sex couples to marry in 
Massachusetts, 13 eight same-sex couples filed suit to challenge 
Connecticut's denial of their right to marry. 14 The primary argu­
ments in the Connecticut case, much like the other state cases, 
were equality and due process of law under the state 
constitution. 
While this litigation was underway, Connecticut passed a law 
in 2005 that created civil unions as an alternative to marriage for 
same-sex couples while simultaneously defining marriage as ex­
clusively between one man and one woman. 15 Similar legislation 
had already passed in Vermont, California, and New Jersey, and 
has since been adopted in New Hampshire.
16 
Connecticut's civil union law provided many of the same 
substantive protections for same-sex couples as California's do­
mestic partnership laws. Therefore, the Connecticut case was the 
second one to reach a high court in a jurisdiction which had in 
place a near marriage equivalent. It was because of this compre­
hensive protection under law that the Connecticut Superior 
Court rejected the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and 
granted that of the state defendants. The outcome of the lower 
court's resolution of the case could have been predicted from the 
opening line of the opinion (stating the existence of the civil 
union law) and the framing of the case. 17 As framed by Judge 
Patty Pittman, the issue before the court was whether it should 
declare the distinction between civil unions and marriage, a dis­
13 Goodridge,798 N.E.2d 941. 
14 Jane Gordon, Gay MarriageCase Now Before the Court,N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 2, 2006, at 3. 
15 An Act Concerning Civil Unions, CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 46b-38aa ­
46b-38pp (2005). 
16 N.H REV. STAT. § 457-A:1 (2008). 
17 Kerrigan v. State, 909 A.2d 89 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2006). 
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tinction the court viewed as being one of name only, to be one of 
constitutional magnitude. 
In fairly pointed language, the Connecticut Superior Court 
analogized the case to one that might be brought by a woman 
offended by the incorporation of male gendered pronouns in the 
criminal law or by the statement in the state constitution that "all 
men . . . are equal in rights." According to Judge Pittman, 
"While one may yet feel a pang at the historical injustice 
presented by this phrase, it is of no legal significance." 18 Moreo­
ver, explained Judge Pittman, "offensiveness is largely in the eye 
of the beholder."' 19 As a result, she concluded that "the naming 
of legal matters [is] an area particularly suited to legislative 
rather than judicial policy-making. 
'20 
The plaintiff couples appealed the case, which was taken on 
direct appellate review by the state high court. Similar to the 
context in California, Connecticut's comprehensive marriage 
equivalent forced the high court to analyze the statutory exclu­
sion of same-sex couples from marriage in a jurisdiction where 
the legislature had already spoken to the importance of ex­
tending comprehensive family protections to families formed by 
same-sex couples. Contrary to the lower court's reasoning, the 
Connecticut Supreme Court acknowledged that the distinction 
between civil unions and marriage is not "constitutionally insig­
nificant"21 and that "because the institution of marriage carries 
with it a status and significance that the newly created classifica­
tion of civil unions does not embody, the segregation of hetero­
sexual and homosexual couples into separate institutions 
constitutes a cognizable harm."' 22 Connecticut's high court found 
that, although the civil union law purported to offer same-sex 
couples "all the same benefits, protections, and responsibilities 
under law" as marriage, 23 this statutory framework denied same-
sex couples at least one fundamentally important right, "the free­
dom to marry."
'24 
18 Id. at 98 (emphasis in original). 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 415. 
22 Id. at 412. 
23 CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 46b-38nn; Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 413. 
24 Kerrigan,957 A.2d at 416. 
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In analyzing the plaintiff couples' equal protection chal­
lenge, Connecticut's high court deemed sexual orientation to be 
a "quasi-suspect" classification, like gender, and therefore ap­
plied heightened or intermediate scrutiny to assess the constitu­
tionality of the state's discriminatory marriage law. 25 The court's 
conclusion that sexual orientation is a quasi-suspect classification 
deserving of heightened scrutiny was based on the historic and 
enduring "purposeful and invidious discrimination" against gays 
and lesbians and the fact that this minority group's defining char­
acteristic (their sexual orientation) is of no meaningful conse­
quence to their participation in society.2 6 Moreover, the court 
determined that sexual orientation is "such an essential compo­
nent of personhood" that it would be "wholly unacceptable" for 
the state to require modification. 27 As a result, the court applied 
intermediate scrutiny and held that the marriage statute violated 
the state's constitutional guarantee of equal protection because 
the state failed to demonstrate that denying the right to marry on 
the basis of sexual orientation was "substantially related to an 
important government interest. 2' 8 
Because the state failed to meet its burden under the inter­
mediate scrutiny standard, the court declined to reach the issue 
of whether sexual orientation is a suspect classification deserving 
strict scrutiny.29 Thus, Connecticut's high court diverged from 
both the high court in California that applied strict scrutiny, and 
high courts in Massachusetts and other states that applied some 
version of rational basis review to decide whether excluding 
same-sex couples from marriage violates state constitutional 
law.3
0 
On November 4, 2008, Connecticut voters rejected a refer­
endum to hold a constitutional convention in which a state con­
stitutional provision to undermine the Kerrigan v. Commissioner 
25 Id.
 




28 Id. at 423 (citing Ramos v. Vernon, 353 F.3d 171, 175 (2d Cir. 2003). 
29 Id.
 
30 Goodridge,798 N.E.2d at 961.
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of PublicHealth ruling could have been introduced. 31 No viable 
political threat to marriage equality remains in Connecticut. 




California was the second state to permit same-sex couples 
to marry. As the most populous state, one in which one out of 
nine Americans lives (just over 10 percent), its legal landscape 
has often served as a bellwether for the rest of the country. The 
passage of the Proposition 8 ballot initiative that defined mar­
riage as only heterosexual marriage undermined the constitu­
tional foundation of the decision coming out of the consolidated 
marriage cases. The outcome in the case challenging Proposition 
8 has become, therefore, even that much more significant to the 
marriage equality movement. This section analyzes the history 
leading up to the marriage case, the case itself, the Proposition 8 
ballot initiative, and the litigation challenging the validity of the 
process used to change California's constitution. 
A. 	Pre-CaseMarriageActivity 
In re Marriage Cases have a somewhat long, and definitely 
complicated, procedural history.32 This history is worth describ­
ing in some detail to convey the depth and breadth of the politi­
cal landscape on both sides of the "v" in the consolidated 
marriage cases. The consolidated cases date indirectly back to 
February, 2004, when the City of San Francisco, at the initiative 
of Mayor Gavin Newsom, began issuing marriage licenses to 
same-sex couples.33 The relevant time period was the 180 day 
gap between when the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu­
setts34 issued its opinion in Goodridge v. Department of Public 
Health, holding that same-sex couples could not constitutionally 
31 	 Equality's Winding Path, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2008, at A32; Kerrigan, 
957 A.2d at 413. 
32 	 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384. 
33 	 Carolyn Marshall, Dozens of Gay Couples Marry in San FranciscoCer­
emonies, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2004, at A24. 
34 The issued date was Nov. 20, 2003. The opinion stated, "Entry of judg­
ment shall be stayed for 180 days to permit the Legislature to take such action 
as it may deem appropriate in light of this opinion." Goodridge 798 N.E.2d at 
970. 
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be excluded from the Commonwealth's marriage statutes, and 
the effective date of that opinion. During that gap period, a num­
ber of localities, including some in New York35 and San Francisco 
in California began issuing marriage licenses in anticipation that 
the state courts in those jurisdictions would agree with the Good-
ridge Court. 
Opponents of marriage equality in California and elsewhere 
sought to quickly shut down the availability of marriage licenses 
to same-sex couples. In California, the effort to shut down the 
issuance of such licenses was initiated by the Attorney General 
through a writ petition to the California Supreme Court and by a 
case brought by the Proposition 22 Legal Defense Fund.36 The 
latter case relied on Family Section 308.5 (the initiative statute 
known as Proposition 22 adopted by California voters in March 
2000),37 while the former principally argued that the local offi­
cials lacked authority to issue licenses in the absence of a deter­
minative court decision.38 In response to the Attorney General's 
writ petition, the California Supreme Court issued a temporary 
injunction followed by a final decision, both of which ordered the 
City of San Francisco not to issue licenses and invalidated any 
licenses already issued.39 In that final decision, Lockyer v. San 
Francisco,the California high court expressly reserved judgment 
on the substantive issue raised by the Proposition 22 Legal De­
fense Fund - that is, whether the state constitution could sustain 
35 Thomas Crampton, Same-Sex Marriage:New Paltz; Despite Charges, 
Mayor Pledges to Keep Marrying Gay Couples, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2004 (New 
York/Region); Thomas Crampton & Christine Hauser, Gay MarriageDebate 
Shifts to Small New York Village, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2004 (New York/Re­
gion); Lisa W. Foderaro, Mayors Asked to Face the Music, as in a Same-Sex 
Wedding March, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2004 (New York/Region). 
36 Lockyer v. San Francisco, 95 P.3d 459, 465-66 (Cal. 2004). 
37 CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5 (2004) states that "[o]nly marriage between a 
man and a woman is valid or recognized in California." Plaintiffs in the Mar­
riage Cases maintained that this initiative amendment only applied to marriages 
entered into outside of California and was not relevant to the determination of 
whether same-sex couples could marry in California. The Proposition 22 Legal 
Defense Fund disagreed arguing that it applied as a limiting principle both to 
marriages entered into in and outside of California. In re MarriageCases, 183 
P.3d at 409-410. 
38 Id. at 466-67. 
39 Id. at 467. 
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an exclusionary statutory framework for marriage.40 That issue 
was squarely presented in cases filed (and eventually consoli­
dated) both by the City of San Francisco and 20 same-sex couples 
in five different suits challenging their exclusion from the law. 
Those cases became the consolidated cases resolved by In re 
Marriage Cases.
41 
The other significant development that took place in be­
tween the issuance of the Goodridge opinion and the ultimate 
resolution of the consolidated cases was California's adoption of 
a comprehensive domestic partnership law.42 Unlike in Massa­
chusetts where there had been scant or no protections for same-
sex couples wishing to create families,43 California had incre­
mentally added benefits and protections within a structure it 
called domestic partnership to the point where when the mar­
riage cases were finally resolved, the status was a near-equivalent 
to marriage. 44 It was a near-equivalent because there were dif­
ferences between the benefits and protections associated with 
marriage and those associated with domestic partnerships but, as 
the California Supreme Court characterized them, they were 
40 Id. at 397 ("Our decision in Lockyer emphasized ... that the substan­
tive question of the constitutional validity of the California marriage statutes 
was not before this court in that proceeding, and that our decision was not in­
tended to reflect any view on that issue."). 
41 Id. 
42 California's domestic partnership law developed incrementally through 
at least 16 separate bills starting in 1999, each slowly adding benefits, protec­
tions, and responsibilities. See National Center for Lesbian Rights, The Evolu­
tion of California Domestic Partnership Law, Sept. 5, 2007, http://www.ncl 
rights.org/site/DocServer/timeline-ab205_042307.pdf?doclD=1265. 
43 In fact, unlike in California where there were affirmative developments 
in the form of growing domestic partnership benefits, the effort to add substan­
tive domestic partnership benefits in the form of partner health insurance was 
shut down by the Supreme Judicial Court in a challenge initiated by a ten tax­
payer suit challenging the authority of municipalities to do so. Connors v. City 
of Boston, 714 N.E.2d 335 (Mass. 1999). 
44 It bears mention to fully appreciate the political climate in California 
that predated the issuance of the In re MarriageCases decision that the Califor­
nia legislature twice passed bills authorizing marriage for same-sex couples. 
Both times the legislation was vetoed by Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger. 
Jordan Rau & Nancy Vogel, Governor Vetoes Same-Sex MarriageBill, L.A. 
TIMES, Sept. 30, 2005 at B3, availableat http://articles.latimes.com/2005/sep/30/ 
local/me-gays30; Jill Tucker, Governor Cites Prop. 22 as He Vetoes Leno Bill, 
S.F. CHRON., Oct. 13, 2007, at B2. 
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"relatively minor. ' 45 Again by the California court's characteri­
zation, the domestic partnership status could better be under­
stood as one comparable to the near marriage-equivalent status 
of civil unions embraced by the states of Vermont, New Hamp­
shire, New Jersey and Connecticut. 46 Of course, both domestic 
partnership status and civil union status are uniquely different 
than marriage in the characterization of the relationship. Just as 
in Connecticut, it was the magnitude and significance of this dis­
tinction that the California court had to evaluate. 
B. In re MarriageCases 
The answer to the question of the extent to which domestic 
partnership and marriage are equivalent legal statuses is, in many 
ways, at the heart of the In re MarriageCases opinion. The rea­
son for that may be obvious, but given its significance is worth 
articulating. In California by the time the consolidated cases 
reached the high court, the legislature had spoken to the issue of 
the significance of families formed by same-sex couples. By cre­
ating the near equivalent status of domestic partnership, the leg­
islative intent to treat comparably same-sex couples and 
different-sex ones was clear. As the high court agreed, the do­
mestic partnership and marital statuses were at their essence 
equal in terms of benefits, obligations, and protections. The only 
difference was in the name. That difference was key to the high 
court's fundamental constitutional rights analysis and is worth 
examining in some detail. 
The starting point of the court's analysis was the couples' 
claim that their exclusion from marriage violated core liberty and 
autonomy rights guaranteed by the California constitution. As 
the court explained, California precedent well-established as a 
constitutional value the "right of two adults who share a loving 
45 There are nine enumerated in In re MarriageCases,concerning mainly 
differences between domestic partnerships and marriages in eligibility require­
ments, the procedures for establishing or dissolving each, and a few provisions 
such as "confidential marriages" and a rarely-used veteran's housing tax deduc­
tion that seem to have slipped through the cracks when creating legislation, or 
that would not apply to same-sex couples because they are provisions affected 
by federal law. 183 P.3d at 416 n.24. 
46 Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 46b-38pp (2005); New Hampshire: 
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 457-A:1-A:8 (2008); New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 37:1-28 (2007); Vermont: 15 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201 (1999). 
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relationship to join together to establish an officially recognized 
family of their own," 47 a right generally understood as the right 
to marry. In response to this claim, the Attorney General of Cal­
ifornia agreed with the existence of such a right but maintained 
that the right protected was one that is defined by substance and 
not by form. In other words, argued the Attorney General, be­
cause same-sex couples were afforded all of the substantive pro­
tections of marriage through the domestic partnership law and 
denied only the status, designation, or name of marriage, no con­
stitutional violation could be shown. 
48 
The California court disagreed. As it explained, the consoli­
dated cases did not present the interesting (but irrelevant) ques­
tion about whether the legislature could deny the denomination 
of marriage to all couples ("perhaps in order to emphasize and 
clarify that this civil institution is distinct from the religious insti­
tution of marriage"). 49 But, because the burden of being denied 
the demarcation of marriage fell exclusively to families formed 
by same-sex couples, the distinction could not survive constitu­
tional scrutiny. At the core of the constitutionally guaranteed 
right to marry was the right to have the established "family rela­
tionship [be] accorded dignity and respect equal to that accorded 
other officially recognized families."' 50 Reserving the designation 
of the name "marriage" exclusively for different-sex couples 
posed a "serious risk of denying the family relationship of same-
sex couples such equal dignity and respect."' 51 As the California 
court recognized, none of the other marriage cases challenging 
state exclusionary marriage laws had presented the question that 
was before this high court because in none of the other marriage 
cases had an exclusionary marriage law been challenged in a ju­
risdiction that had created a near-marriage equivalent.52 As a 
47 In re MarriageCases, 183 P.3d at 399. 
48 Brief of Cal. Att'y Gen., In re MarriageCases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) 
(No. S147999). 
49 In re MarriageCases, 183 P.3d at 399-400. 
50 Id. at 400. 
51 Id. 
52 As the court acknowledged, the same question had, however, been ad­
dressed in a case that was brought in Massachusetts after the Goodridge case 
was decided. In Opinion of the Justices, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004), the Mas­
sachusetts Senate propounded a question to the high court regarding whether in 
response to the Goodridge opinion, the legislature could adopt a comprehen­
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result, this was the first high court to grapple with the question of 
what the word "marriage" means separate and apart from the 
substantive protections and obligations it imparts in the context 
of a case brought in a state where a legislature had already man­
dated marriage near-equivalence. 53 In striking down the exclu­
sionary laws, the court acknowledged the significance of 
marriage for same-sex couples while at the same time appreciat­
ing the inequality that resulted from the differential licensing 
schemes. 
As a result, the fundamental rights analysis was tightly inter­
woven with the equal protection claim. In pursuit of their equal 
protection claim, the plaintiffs argued that the exclusionary mar­
riage statutes created classifications based on sex and sexual ori­
entation. The high court disagreed that the statutes created a 
sex-based classification but agreed that the exclusionary scheme 
created a sexual orientation classification. In response to the de­
fendants' argument that the exclusion did not create a sexual ori­
entation classification because gay people were free to marry, 
just not to marry someone of the same sex, the court found it 
"sophistic" because the argument would "require the negation of 
the person's sexual orientation. '54 
Having found a classification, the court moved on to the ap­
plicable level of scrutiny. For the first time in California, and in a 
part of the opinion that will have far-reaching effects beyond the 
marriage issue, the court held that the applicable standard of re­
view for a sexual orientation statutory classification is "strict 
sive law based on the Vermont civil union model that would give same-sex 
couples all of the rights, responsibilities, and obligations of marriage but deny 
the status. In a 4-3 opinion, the Supreme Judicial Court said the legislature 
could not constitutionally do so. As that court said, "[T]he traditional, historic 
nature and meaning of civil marriage in Massachusetts is as a wholly secular and 
dynamic legal institution, the governmental aim of which is to encourage stable 
adult relationships for the good of the individual and of the community, espe­
cially its children. The very nature and purpose of civil marriage, the court con­
cluded, renders unconstitutional any attempt to ban all same-sex couples, as 
same-sex couples, from entering into civil marriage." Id. at 569. 
53 The Connecticut high court also grappled with the meaning of the word 
marriage in Kerrigan.957 A.2d at 417-19. 
54 In re MarriageCases, 183 P.3d at 441. 
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scrutiny. ' '55 While the court of appeals had found that the sexual 
orientation classification could not be considered "suspect," the 
high court disagreed. Both courts easily found that the classifica­
tion met the requirements that, first, the characteristic bears no 
relation to a person's ability to perform or contribute to society; 
and, second, the characteristic is associated with a stigma of in­
feriority and second class citizenship manifested by the group's 
history of legal and social disabilities. 56 
The point on which the California Supreme Court departed, 
however, from the court of appeals' analysis was on the signifi­
cance of the third requirement for suspect classifications, the im­
mutability factor. As the California Supreme Court said, 
"immutability is not invariably required in order for a character­
istic to be considered a suspect classification for equal protection 
purposes. '57 By analogy, the court explained that religion is a 
suspect classification despite the fact that religion is a "matter 
over which an individual has control. '58 Citing international 
law,59 the California court found that sexual orientation, whether 
or not immutable, is such a "deeply personal characteristic that 
[it] is either unchangeable or changeable only at unacceptable 
personal costs."' 60 Rejecting the Attorney General's argument 
that a fourth requirement should be demonstrated, that of "polit­
ical powerlessness," the high court concluded that sexual orienta­
tion is a suspect classification subject to strict scrutiny. 
Having identified strict scrutiny as the applicable standard of 
review, the court acknowledged the state bears a heavy burden 
to justify the existing legal structure. Not only would the state 
have to advance a constitutionally compelling interest in "reserv­
ing the designation of marriage" 61 only for different-sex couples 
55 Id. at 441. In a separate section, the court rejected the plaintiffs' claim 
that the statute created a classification based on sex. To the contrary, the court 
found that the statute treated men and women the same with respected to the 
marriage conclusion. However, because it did create a classification that al­
lowed different-sex but not same-sex couples to marry, the court proceeded 
with its sexual orientation classification analysis. Id. at 439-440. 
56 Id. at 442. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Egan v. Canada, 2 S.C.R. 513 (1995). 
60 183 P.3d at 442. 
61 Id. at 446. 
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and excluding same-sex couples from that designation, but it 
would also have to demonstrate that the statutory framework 
was necessary to serve the compelling interest. Because the state 
could neither articulate a compelling state interest served by the 
differential treatment of gay, lesbian, or bisexual partners nor 
show that the differential treatment was necessary to serve the 
compelling state interest, the exclusionary system failed. In ap­
plying the standard of review, the court rejected the arguments 
that the constitutionally compelling interest behind the statutory 
scheme could be either preserving traditional marriage or en­
couraging responsible procreation.62 The court also rejected jus­
tifications for the exclusion offered by the non-state defendants 
that the state constitution had mandated it somehow by referring 
in earlier versions to gendered terms, like "wife" and "husband," 
in including constitutional protection for separate property 
rights.63 
Turning to remedy, the court applied traditional remedy ju­
risprudence in its evaluation of whether the exclusionary scheme 
should be remedied by extending the exclusion to all or curing 
the exclusion by including the excluded class.64 In a brief part of 
the opinion, the court determined that extending marriage equal­
ity to the excluded group would more closely approximate the 
likely intent of the legislature had it recognized the unconstitu­
tionality of the exclusion.65 As a technical matter, the court 
struck the provision of the family law statutes that designated 
marriage as the union between a man and a woman and found 
that the initiative statute that the court had found to apply to in­
state and out-of-state marriages had no constitutional effect.66 
Risking no confusion about the effect of the order, the court 
found plaintiffs entitled to the issuance of the writ requested in­
cluding directing relevant government officials administering the 
marriage laws to act consistently with the decision of the court. 
Immediately following the issuance of the In re Marriage Cases 
opinion, opponents of marriage equality filed an action seeking 
rehearing focusing in particular on the issue of remedy, arguing 
62 Id. at 432. 
63 Id. at 447. 
64 Id. at 452-453. 
65 Id.
 
66 Id. at 470-471.
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that the opinion was unclear on that point. That action also 
called for a general stay of the effect of the opinion for a five 
month period after which the parties argued that the citizens of 
the state would have the opportunity to vote by initiative on a 
constitutional amendment that would, if passed, reverse the 
court. A motion filed by eleven state attorneys general asked for 
the same relief to stave off litigation that could result in their 
states as a result of the California marriage decision. The court 
rejected the efforts at delay of implementation. The state di­
rected local officials to begin issuing marriage licenses and such 
licenses began to issue on June 16.67 Between June 16, 2008, and 
when the change to the California constitution that defined mar­
riage as between a man and a woman became effective on No­
vember 5, 2008, approximately 18,000 same-sex couples were 
married in California. 68 
C. 	Proposition8 Writes Discriminationinto California's 
Constitution 
On November 4, 2008, the day United States voters elected 
Barack Obama as president, Californians passed Proposition 8.69 
Passage of the Proposition 8 ballot initiative changed California's 
constitution by defining marriage as exclusively being between a 
man and a woman, effectively reversing the state high court's de­
cision in In re MarriageCases and reinstating California's prohi­
bition of same-sex marriage. 70 Constitutional initiatives require 
only a majority of voters' support to pass in California, 71 and 
Proposition 8 received over fifty-one percent of the vote.72 The 
67 In re Marriage Cases, 2008 WL 5507760 (June 19, 2008). 
68 Garance Burke, Clerks Confused Over When Gay MarriageBan Be­
gins, A.P., Nov. 13, 2008. 
69 Jesse McKinley, With Same-Sex Marriage, a Court Takes on the Peo
ple's Voice, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2008, at A18. 
70 CAL. CONST. art. 1 § 7.5. Proposition 8 added a new section (7.5) to 
Article I of California's constitution. Id. The text of the new section asserts that: 
"[o]nly marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in Califor­
nia." Id. 
71 	 CAL. CONST. art. 1 § 4. 
72 	 McKinley, supra note 69, at A18. 
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constitutional change took effect immediately (on November 5, 
2008).73 
D. Current Litigation Challengingthe Validity of Proposition8 
On November 19, 2008, the California Supreme Court 
granted review of three cases challenging the validity of Proposi­
tion 8 and denied 'two petitioners' requests for a stay of the con­
stitutional change: 74 The crux of the issue presented relates to 
the nature of the change Proposition 8 effected to the California 
constitution and the process by which it was carried out. 
Proposition 8 was initiated by the electorate, not the legisla­
ture, and this raised significant procedural concerns prior and 
subsequent to its passage.75 Article 18 of California's constitution 
distinguishes between the processes for amending and revising its 
text.76 Whereas the electorate can propose an amendment to the 
constitution by initiative which then goes on the ballot, a pro­
posed revision to the constitution must originate in the legisla­
ture and receive approval from two-thirds of both houses before 
either going to a popular vote or a constitutional convention. 
77 
Case law defines a constitutional revision, as distinct from a con­
stitutional amendment, as an effort to change fundamental "un­
derlying principles"78 of the state's constitution, or as an effort 
that constitutes "far reaching changes in the nature of our basic 
government plan."' 79 Therefore, deciding whether changing Cali­
fornia's definition of marriage to categorically exclude same-sex 
73 CAL. CONST. art. 1 § 4 ("A proposed amendment or revision shall be 
submitted to the electors and if approved by a majority of votes thereon takes 
effect the day after the election unless the measureprovides otherwise."). 
74 Strauss v. Horton, No. S168047 (Cal. order to show cause filed Nov. 19, 
2008); Tyler v. State of California, No. S168066 (Cal. order to show cause filed 
Nov. 19, 2008); City and County of San Francisco v. Horton, No. S168078 (Cal. 
order to show cause filed Nov. 19, 2008). 
75 Bennett v. Bowen, No. S164520 (Cal. Sup. Ct., 2008); Strauss v. Hor­
ton, No. S168047 (Cal. Sup. Ct., 2008); Tyler v. State of California, No. S168066 
(Cal. Sup. Ct., 2008); City and County of San Francisco v. Horton, No. S168078 
(Cal. Sup. Ct., 2008); Maura Dolan, CaliforniaSupreme Court Keeps Anti-Gay 
Marriage Initiative on Ballot, L.A. TiMES, July 17, 2008. 
76 See CAL. CONST. art. 18. 
77 See id. at §§ 1-3. 
78 Livermore v. Waite, 36 P. 424, 102 Cal. 113, 117-19, 123-24 (1894). 
79 Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equaliza­
tion, 583 P.2d 1281, 22 Cal. 3d 208, 223 (Cal. 1978). 
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couples is properly categorized as a constitutional amendment or 
a constitutional revision is central to determining the validity of 
Proposition 8. 
In its order to show cause why relief sought by petitioners 
should not be granted, the court directed the State of California 
and its agents to brief the following questions: 
(1) Is Proposition 8 invalid because it constitutes a revision of, rather 
than an amendment to, the California Constitution? 
(2) Does Proposition 8 violate the separation of powers doctrine 
under the California Constitution? 
(3) If Proposition 8 is not unconstitutional, what is its effect, if any, on 
the marriages of same-sex couples performed before the adoption of 
Proposition 8?80 
In the respondent's brief, the Attorney General answered no to 
questions one and two and opined that, even if upheld as consti­
tutional, Proposition 8 should have a prospective effect only.
81 If 
the Attorney General is right in its effects argument, same-sex 
couples who married in the interim between when In re Marriage 
Cases took effect and the day after passage of Proposition 8 can 
be confident that their marriages are valid. 
The final portion of the State's brief, including the Attorney 
General's ultimate conclusion, is perhaps the most significant. 
The Attorney General's response exceeded the scope of the 
court's questions and put the state firmly on record for support­
ing judicial invalidation of Proposition 8.82 After answering the 
court's enumerated questions, the Attorney General argued that 
even if Proposition 8 was procedurally appropriate as a properly 
initiated amendment, Proposition 8 should be "invalidated as vi­
olating the inalienable right of liberty found in article 1, section 1 
of [California's] Constitution. ' 83 The Attorney General ex­
plained that marriage is a fundamental liberty and that as an ina­
lienable right protected under Article 1 of California's 
constitution, it should not be abrogated in the absence of a com­
pelling government interest. 84 Thus, the Attorney General "har­
monize[d]" same-sex couples' constitutional right to marry with 
80 Id.
 
81 See Brief for Respondent at 61, 91, City and County of San Francisco v.
 
Horton, No. S168078 (Cal. Feb. 3, 2009). 
82 See id. at 91. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 76-77, 90, 
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the people's power to amend the constitution by initiative by 
subjecting Proposition 8 to strict scrutiny, which it must fail.
85 
The court already held in In re MarriageCases that there was no 
compelling reason to deny people's right to marry based on the 
suspect classification of sexual orientation, and the language of 
Proposition 8 is the same as the former language of Family Code 
308.5 	 that the court struck down.86 The California Supreme 
Court heard oral arguments for the cases challenging Proposition 
8 on March 5, 2009.87 
IV. 	Cases Decided Between Goodridge and In re 
Marriage Cases 
In many ways, the California case can be viewed as one that 
re-shifted the momentum behind the issue of marriage equality, 
coming as it did after five high courts departed from the Massa­
chusetts outcome. 
Between the time Goodridgewas decided and when the Cal­
ifornia court considered the same issue, five other state supreme 
courts heard challenges to and sustained exclusionary state mar­
riage laws.88 In one of them, the New Jersey Supreme Court held 
unconstitutional the statutory framework but declined to remedy 
it by requiring that same-sex couples be allowed to marry.89 In 
the other four states, Maryland, New York, Oregon, and Wash­
ington, the high courts fully sustained the exclusionary laws. In 
Maryland, Oregon, and Washington, the legislature passed do­
mestic partnership laws subsequent to the courts' decisions that 
provided same-sex couples with limited rights and benefits.90 
85 See id. at 89-90. 
86 See id. at 90. 
87 Press Release, Lynn Holton, Public Information Officer, Administra­
tive Office of the Courts, Judicial Council of California (Feb. 3, 2009), available 
at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/presscenter/newsreleases/NR08-09.PDF. 
88 See Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571 (Md. 2007); Lewis v. Harris, 908 
A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006); 
Li. & Kennedy v. Oregon,, 110 P.3d 91 (Or. 2005); Andersen v. King County, 
138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2005). 
89 Lewis, 908 A.2d 196. 
90 Oregon Family Fairness Act, ch. 99, 2007 Or. Laws (became effective 
July 22, 2007); 2008 Md. Laws 590 (passed May 22, 2008 and became effective 
July 1, 2008); Act of April 21, 2007, ch. 156, 2007 Wash. Sess. Laws (passed Apr. 
21, 2007, and became effective July 22, 2007). 
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As in California and Massachusetts, plaintiffs in the other 
states challenged state marriage laws focusing principally on 
equality and due process protections under state constitutions. 
However, none of the plaintiffs in those cases could convince 
their state courts that classifications based on sexual orientation 
required a heightened level of scrutiny. Applying rational basis 
review, those courts had little problem accepting some state justi­
fication for the differential treatment of same and different-sex 
couples. In both New York and Washington, the courts con­
cluded that the state anti-marriage laws9' were constitutional be­
cause they served the legitimate purpose of encouraging 
procreation and the well-being of children. The New York law 
was challenged under equal protection and due process. 92 The 
Washington law was challenged under privileges and immunities 
and due process. 93 The courts spent very little time discussing 
equal protection, due process, or privileges and immunities after 
rationalizing the prohibitions on same-sex marriage, simply reit­
erating procreation and child welfare as legitimate purposes for 
the state exclusionary laws. Because marriage for same-sex 
couples could not, according to the courts, encourage procreation 
or child welfare, the state bans on same-sex marriage did not 
deny plaintiff couples their constitutional rights. 94 The Her­
nandez court went even further in rejecting the scientific legiti­
macy of the studies that suggest that children raised by same-sex 
children are no worse off than those raised by different-sex 
95parents.
91 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 12 (1999) (marriage-how solemnized), N.Y. 
DOM. REL. LAW § 15 (1999) (marriage- duty of town and city clerk), N.Y. DOM. 
REL. LAW § 5 (2008) (incestuous and void marriages), N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW 
§ 50 (2008) (property of married woman); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.010 
(1998) (marriage as a civil contract that is valid only if "between a male and a 
female"); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.020(1)(c) (1998) (marriage contract is pro­
hibited for couples "other than a male and a female."); WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 26.04.020(3) (1998) ("[a] marriage between two persons that is recognized as 
valid in another jurisdiction is valid in this state only if the marriage is not pro­
hibited or made unlawful under subsection ... (1)(c) ... of this section."). 
92 Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d 1. 
93 Andersen, 138 P.3d 963. 
94 Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d 1; Andersen, 138 P.3d 963. 
95 Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 8. 
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In Oregon and New Jersey, deference to the state legislature 
largely resolved the cases. In Oregon, plaintiffs brought a lawsuit 
against the state after the State Registrar refused to file marriage 
licenses that were issued by their county of residence, Multno­
mah County. The plaintiffs argued the refusal violated Oregon's 
privileges and immunities clause. However, before the Oregon 
Supreme Court could resolve that issue, the voters of Oregon 
passed a law defining marriage as being exclusively between a 
man and a woman. The Oregon Supreme Court ultimately said 
that its role was to enforce the voters' intent, and because the 
voters defined marriage heterosexually, the Oregon Supreme 
Court upheld that definition. 96 In New Jersey, plaintiffs filed a 
lawsuit against the state because of its refusal to grant licenses to 
same-sex couples. They argued this violated their privacy, equal 
protection and due process rights.97 The New Jersey Supreme 
Court agreed that same-sex couples are entitled to equality, but 
disagreed that there was a fundamental right at stake in the case 
for the plaintiffs.98 Ultimately, the court determined that the is­
sue raised a legislative question. In response to the decision, the 
New Jersey legislature passed a civil union law. 99 
V. 	Viability of Marriages of Out-of-State Couples 
Married in Massachusetts 
Notwithstanding the setbacks in some states where same-sex 
couples sought marriage equality and the slow progress to equal­
ity across the country, the fact of Massachusetts allowing same-
sex couples to marry impacted marriage equality nationwide. 
While there remain some questions about the validity of certain 
marriages enterered into in Massachusetts by non-resident 
couples, there is also certainty about the validity of others. 
The Massachusetts marriage case was significant for setting a 
precedent, allowing same-sex couples, for the first time in this 
96 Li v. State, 110 P.3d 91 (Or. 2005). 
97 Lewis, 908 A.2d 196. 
98 Id. at 205. 
99 A recent study commissioned by the legislature concluded that civil 
unions are inadequate to protect same-sex couples. What steps the legislature 
will take in response to this study is unclear. The first interim report of the New 
Jersey Civil Union Review Commission, Feb. 19, 2008, is available at: http:// 
www.state.nj.us/lps/dcr/downloads/lst-InterimReport-CURC.pdf. 
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country, to marry. In seeming acknowledgement of the weight of 
this fact, the Supreme Judicial Court did not issue an immediate 
remedy to the plaintiffs. Rather, it concluded that, "[e]ntry of 
judgment shall be stayed for 180 days to permit the Legislature to 
take such action as it may deem appropriate in light of this opin­
ion."' 00 While there was some initial question whether this 
meant that the court would allow the legislature to create a mar­
riage equivalent, the likes of which had been created by Ver­
mont's adoption of a civil union law, 101 any confusion about the 
matter was cleared up in response to a question put to the Su­
preme Judicial Court by the Massachusetts Senate President. In 
Opinion of the Justices, the high court put to rest any suggestion 
that the court had left open such a possibility. As the court made 
clear, "[the bill] would deny to same-sex 'spouses' only a status 
that is specially recognized in society and has significant social 
and other advantages. The Massachusetts Constitution, as the 
Goodridgeopinion explained, does not permit such invidious dis­
0 2 
crimination, no matter how well intentioned."'
1
Nevertheless, because of the time permitted for enforcement 
of the Goodridge decision to allow the legislature to take some 
action-the substance of which was never clear and which was 
never taken-same-sex couples were not permitted to marry in 
Massachusetts until May 17, 2004. On that day, however, hun­
dreds of couples flocked to local city and town halls to marry, 
many seeking and securing court orders allowing bypass of the 
usual waiting period between the filing of paperwork to marry 
and the issuance of the licenses themselves.'0 3 Among those who 
married included individuals from throughout the country who 
came to Massachusetts to marry their loved ones despite not be­
ing residents of the Commonwealth. 
For a short period of time, many town clerks issued licenses 
freely to out-of-state couples. Former Massachusetts Governor 
Mitt Romney stopped that practice shortly after it began through 
a directive issued by then-Attorney General Tom Reilly. The di­
rective called to the towns' attention the criminal enforcement 
100 Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 970.
 
101 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201-1207 (1999).
 
102 Opinion of the Justices, 802 N.E.2d 565, 570 (Mass. 2004).
 
103 Thomas Caywood, Same-Sex Marriage"Mass. Gay Couples Wedded to
 
History, BOSTON HERALD, May 18, 2004, at 6. 
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statute for issuing licenses to non-residents in violation of the 
Massachusetts reverse evasion law.1°4 The Governor instructed 
the Attorney General to take this action after an investigation 
that involved a review of the records from several towns that the 
news media had reported were marrying out-of-state same-sex 
couples. 
The Governor's view of the enforceability of the law was not 
immediately obvious given that the statute had been a dead letter 
for many years. In addition, similar reverse evasion laws had 
only ever been adopted in five other jurisdictions and it is some­
what unclear the extent to which they had ever been enforced 
0 5either. 1 However, in at least one of those jurisdictions, Ver­
mont, the reverse evasion law had not been enforced 0 6 to ex­
clude out-of-state same-sex couples from traveling to Vermont 
and entering into civil unions notwithstanding the legal chal­
lenges that has created for some couples.' 07 Nonetheless, the 
borders to Massachusetts were effectively shut down to out-of­
state same-sex couples wishing to marry for nearly four years af­
ter the Goodridge case was decided. It was not until July, 2008, 
that the Massachusetts legislature repealed the reverse evasion 
law, finally fully opening the Massachusetts borders to same-sex 
couples from throughout the country to enjoy Massachusetts' 
non-discriminatory laws.' 0 8 
Six couples hailing from Rhode Island, Vermont, New York, 
Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Maine brought a constitu­
tional challenge to the Massachusetts reverse evasion law arguing 
that the law violated the basic guarantees the Massachusetts high 
court had just found protected Massachusetts couples as well as 
guarantees of equality for out-of-state couples otherwise pro­
104 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 207, § 10. 
105 Illinois, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/27 (1915); New Hampshire, N.H. REv. 
STAT. §457:44 (1979); Vermont, 15 VT. STAT. ANN. § 6 (1912); Wisconsin, Wis. 
STAT. ANN. § 765.04 (1915); Wyoming, Wyo, STAT. ANN. 1977 § 20-1-103 
(1912). 
106 Indeed, the Vermont Supreme Court has since said that the reverse 
evasion law may not be enforced to either deny or invalidate civil unions en­
tered into by out-of-state couples. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 
951, I 37-40(Vt. 2006) 
107 See, e.g., Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951(Vt. 2006); 
Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 661 S.E.2d 822 (Va. 2008). 
108 MASS. GEN. LAWS c. 216 of the Acts of 2008. 
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tected under the privileges and immunities clause of the U.S. 
0 9 Constitution. 1 The Supreme Judicial Court disagreed with the 
Massachusetts governor's restrictive interpretation of the reverse 
evasion law although the challenge was only partially 
successful. 110 
In March of 2006, the high court remanded the case and is­
sued guidance regarding both which out-of-state couples could 
marry and what the marital status was of those non-residents 
who had come to Massachusetts to marry in the intervening pe­
riod."' Following that guidance, the trial court on remand deter­
mined that in the absence of any express prohibition against 
same-sex couples marrying in Rhode Island, the Rhode Island 
couple plaintiffs (and other Rhode Island residents) could marry 
in Massachusetts. To the contrary, in light of the intervening 
New York high court decision prohibiting same-sex couples from 
marrying in that state," 2 the New Yorkers could not. However, 
the same judge held New York residents who had married be­
tween May 17, 2004 and July 6, 2006-the date of the New York 
high court decision sustaining the New York exclusionary mar­
riage laws-had done so lawfully." 
3 
As a result of the Cote-Whitacre v. Department of Public 
Health case, the law was clear on the point that some out-of-state 
couples could lawfully marry and others could not. Of course, as 
a factual matter, many out-of-state couples had come to Massa­
chusetts and married despite the later issued opinion suggesting 
that at least some of those licenses had not issued lawfully. The 
question for those couples is what the issuance of that license 
legally means to them. The question has greater significance 
than its personal import to the individuals and couples today be­
cause of what it may mean about the political efforts to reverse 
the road to equality paved by the issuance of the Goodridge 
opinion (and its implementation) and furthered by the In re Mar­
riage Cases decided by the California Supreme Court. The legal 
109 Cote-Whitacre v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 844 N.E.2d 623 (Mass. 2006). 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Hernandez, 7 N.Y.3d 338. 
113 Cote-Whitacre v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 2006 WL 3208758, Memoran­
dum of Decision on Whether Same-Sex Marriage Is Prohibited in N.Y. and 
R.I. (Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 29, 2006). 
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analysis of the meaning of those Massachusetts marriage licenses 
issued when Massachusetts still had a reverse evasion law bears 
greatly on the political efforts to stop the evolution from nation­
wide marriage exclusion for same-sex couples to full nationwide 
equality. 1
14 
As a result of the combined legal landscape created by the 
Romney border closing to out-of-state same-sex couples, the 
challenge to his broad interpretation of the reverse evasion law, 
and its ultimate repeal, significant questions exist for out-of-state 
couples about the validity of their marriages. In sorting through 
the validity of those marriages entered into by non-resident 
couples before the repeal of Massachusetts' reverse evasion law, 
there are two key questions to ask. First, in what state did the 
couple reside when they married? Second, did the couple hon­
estly represent their intention to either reside or not reside in 
Massachusetts in filling out their marriage license application? 
115 
For out-of-state couples who neither resided in nor intended 
to reside in Massachusetts, the validity of their relationship turns 
on what their home state said (or did not say) about the permissi­
bility of marriage between same sex-couples. According to the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, home states can fall into 
one of three categories with regard to the permissibility of a 
same-sex couple entering into a marriage. It can either be a 
"void home state,"1 16 a prohibited home state,"" 7 or a "silent or 
114 In July of 2008, the Massachusetts legislature repealed the reverse eva­
sion law and the new gubernatorial administration lead by Deval Patrick has 
since directed the local city and town clerks to issue marriage license to couples 
regardless of residency. See Katie Zezima, Massachusetts: Same-Sex Couples 
from Other States May Now Marry, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2008, at A13. 
115 The Massachusetts marriage application asks out-of-state couples 
whether they reside or intend to reside in Massachusetts. It is this residency or 
intended residency qualification that satisfies the residency requirement created 
by the now-repealed reverse evasion law. 
116 A void home state is one whose marriage licensing laws explicitly state 
that a marriage entered into by a same-sex couple is "void." The Cote-Whitacre 
court offered Maine as an example of such a state, but many others exist as 
well. 
117 A prohibited home state is one whose laws prohibit same-sex couples 
from marrying but which don't explicitly designate such relationships as "void." 
See Cote-Whitacre, 844 N.E.2d at 636-637 n.9. The Cote-Whitacre court identi­
fied Connecticut, Vermont and New Hampshire as examples. Id. at 637 n.9. 
Each state has incorporated a statement of the prohibition of marriages for 
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ambiguous home state."118 Marriage licenses issued to persons 
residing in a void home state with no intention to reside in Mas­
sachusetts are not valid. That is to say, the marriage licenses 
were unauthorized from their issuance and the resulting marriage 
is therefore void from the date of its inception. At least accord­
ing to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, such marriages 
are "an absolute nullity and [are] not entitled to any recognition 
or legal status" in Massachusetts.1 19 The good news is that there 
is absolute clarity; the bad news is that such marriages have no 
legal significance. 
For couples who came to Massachusetts from home states 
that prohibited same-sex marriage and stated that they have no 
intention to reside in Massachusetts, there is somewhat less clar­
ity about the legal validity of their relationships. Although the 
Supreme Judicial Court made clear that before the repeal of the 
reverse evasion law, couples from prohibited home states could 
not come to Massachusetts and marry, it did not state that such 
licenses are void but rather that they are voidable.' 20 As a result, 
the marriage is a valid marriage until declared void by a court. 
More specifically, the marriage is "presumptively valid" and 
"should for all legal purposes be treated as a valid marriage" un­
less and until a court says otherwise. 21 At least in Massachu­
setts, only a party to the marriage itself can seek dissolution or 
annulment of a voidable marriage. Typically death of one of the 
parties to the marriage would terminate the opportunity of either 
of the parties to seek dissolution or annulment and, again typi­
cally, third parties could not challenge the status of the relation­
ship. 122 Of course, this analysis only reveals what Massachusetts' 
view of the validity of the marriage is and does not answer how 
same-sex couples as part of their adoption of a comprehensive non-marriage 
alternative, civil union. 
118 Silent or ambiguous home states are one whose laws do not include a 
positive prohibition or a positive permission for same-sex couples to marry. 
Rhode Island and New Mexico are examples of silent or ambiguous home 
states. New York was a silent or ambiguous home state until the status of ac­
cess to marriage was clarified by the state high court in the case of Hernandez,7 
N.Y.3d 338. 
119 Cote-Whitacre, 844 N.E.2d at 636 n.8 (citations omitted). 
120 Cote-Whitacre, 844 N.E.2d 623. 
121 Id. at 637 n.10, 638 n.il. 
122 Id. at 636-37. 
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the couples' home state, or any other state for that matter, will 
regard the permissibility of the marriage. Unlike the out-of-state 
residents who married from void home states, couples who mar­
ried from prohibited home states will need to individually assess 
the likely recognition of that marriage in other jurisdictions when 
considering questions such as (1) what legal steps should I take 
to care for my family; (2) must I get divorced to marry again; (3) 
how can I (and do I need to) lift the cloud over the validity of my 
marital status? 
As for out-of-state couples who married from silent or am­
biguous home states, those marriage licenses properly issued are, 
at least from the Massachusetts perspective, perfectly valid. Mas­
sachusetts courts and state agencies have clarified that with re­
spect to couples who came to Massachusetts to marry from 
Rhode Island and New Mexico, those marriage licenses were val­
idly issued.123 As to couples who came from New York, marriage 
licenses issued prior to July 6, 2006, the date of the Hernandez 
decision, were valid. 
124 
All in all, what this analysis suggests is that there are many 
couples from around the country who traveled to Massachusetts 
during the four years when it was the only state to allow mar­
riages for same-sex couples whose marriages were validly issued. 
Moreover, until and unless some future political events transpire, 
Massachusetts borders are open, just as they are for different-sex 
couples, for non-resident same-sex couples to come to the Com­
monwealth and marry. While questions remain about the extent 
to which other states will recognize those marriages, 125 there are 
123 Cote-Whitacre, 844 N.E.2d 623. 
124 There isanother category of people who may have lied on their license 
applications about their intent to reside in Massachusetts. Although Massachu­
setts has typically allowed non-residents to marry regardless of where they re­
sided as long as they intended to relocate to Massachusetts, this loophole will 
likely not ensure the validity of an otherwise issued license if the couple filling 
out the application cannot prove the truth of the assertion. There are no re­
ported decisions in this area of the law but the Cote-Whitacre court reminded 
the plaintiffs that "fraud that goes to the essence of a marriage contract renders 
a marriage 'voidable."' Id. at 637 n.10. In assessing the validity of these mar­
riages, a court may consider both the nature of the misrepresentation and, 
again, who it is that is challenging the validity of the marriage. 
125 Although much predictive scholarship exists about the extent to which 
marriages will be recognized by other states when (at a time when the question 
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no remaining questions about the validity of the licenses that 
issue. 
VI. Iowa on the Horizon 
A challenge to Iowa's exclusionary marriage laws was re­
solved on summary judgment by the District Court for Polk 
County in August, 2007, and then appealed and argued to the 
Iowa Supreme Court on December 9, 2008. A decision by the 
state high court is currently pending.126 The outcome of this case 
may affect the trajectory of marriage equality in this country de­
pending particularly on what happens in California. 
Six same-sex couples with established relationships that 
ranged between 5 and 16 years (at the time the case was brought) 
challenged Iowa's exclusionary marriage laws in a case pursued 
in the District Court for Polk County that was heard on cross-
motions for summary judgment in May, 2007. In a slightly differ­
ent procedural maneuver than that used in any of the other re­
cent marriage cases, the parties filed extensive supporting 
submissions that detailed the facts that would be demonstrated 
upon a trial should the court reject both of the motions for sum­
mary judgment. The Iowa court looked closely at the proposed 
experts and topics and statements that the parties expected to 
establish at trial, rejecting many of those proposed by the de­
fendants as inadmissible. Moreover, the court accepted as mate­
rial facts as to which there is no genuine dispute "all those facts" 
contained in the statement of materials facts submitted in sup­
port of the plaintiffs' summary judgment motion which were de­
nied in the defendant's response. These facts include those that 
was more hypothetical) a state allows same-sex couples to marry, very little has 
been written since Massachusetts and now California began issuing valid li­
censes. Barbara Cox, Interstate Validation of Marriages and Civil Unions, 30 
HUM. RTS. Q. 5 (Summer 2003); Barbara Cox, Same-Sex Marriageand Choice 
of Law: If We Marry in Hawaii, Are We Still Married When We Get Home?, 
1994 Wis. L. REV. 1033-1118; Barbara Cox, Using an 'Incidents of Marriage' 
Analysis When ConsideringInterstate Recognition of Same-Sex Couples' Mar­
riages, Civil Unions, and Domestic Partnerships,13 WIDENER L.J. 699 (2004); 
Joseph William Singer, Same-Sex Marriage,Full Faith and Credit, and the Eva­
sion of Obligation, 1 STAN. J. Civ. RTS. & Civ. LIBERTIES 1 (Apr. 2005). 
126 Varnum v. Brien, No. CV5965 (Iowa Dist. Ct., Polk County, 2007). 
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turned out to be central to the district court's evaluation of the 
application of the standard of review to the challenge. 
In particular, for example, the court found as a material fact 
that "[t]here is consensus within the mainstream scientific com­
munity that parental sexual orientation has no effect on chil­
dren's adjustment. ' 127 The court also determined that "[n]othing 
about a parent's sex or sexual orientation affects either that par­
ent's capacity to be a good parent or a child's health develop­
ment. . . Lesbian and gay persons have the capacity to raise 
healthy and well-adjusted children."'1 28 In no small part based on 
the court's evaluation of the factual issues before it, the district 
court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs and against the 
defendant deciding the case on fundamental rights and equal 
protection. The court rejected all of the justifications offered by 
the defendant including all those resting on child-related grounds 
as well as that of conserving state and private resources and pro­
moting traditional marriage. 
As of the date of publication of this Article, the Iowa Su­
preme Court had heard oral arguments and a decision was 
pending. 
VII. Conclusion 
The last five years have seen both successes and defeats in 
the struggle for marriage equality for same sex couples. No 
doubt, the landmark decision of Goodridge v. Dep't of Public 
Health, in which the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held 
that same-sex couples could not constitutionally be excluded 
from marriage equality, irreversibly changed the legal landscape 
for committed, loving same-sex couples. What could not have 
been predicted at that time and what cannot be predicted still is 
what the course of progress toward full marriage equality nation­
wide (indeed, internationally)1 29 will ultimately look like. 
However, what is known at this time clearly is that 
thousands of couples across this country are legally and validly 
married. This includes couples who have lawfully married in 
127 Id. at 30. 
128 Id. at 31. 
129 The international dimensions of this issue are well beyond the scope of 
this article. 
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Massachusetts, California, and most recently in Connecticut. 
While the future ability to marry in California remains an un­
known, despite legal efforts there and in other parts of the coun­
try to reverse the course of history and shut down the possibility 
of same-sex couples being able to marry, there is no turning 
back. Progress toward full marriage equality has begun in ear­
nest. The next several years may determine the pace at which 
full equality is achieved but there can be no real doubt of its 
attainment. 
